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taking occurred when the Commission was unable to lower the level of
the Black/Clear Lake. The Commission argued that (1) the Saline Bayou
is not a navigable waterway, and (2) Black/Clear Lake does not fall
within the Government's dominant servitude because the lake falls well
outside the physical OHWM. First, the court found that while lowering
the lake not only depends on the level of the Saline Bayou, the lake level
is more importantly directly dependent on the level of the Red River. In
other words, the court determined that the determination of whether
the Saline Bayou was navigable was irrelevant because the Red River is
a navigable waterway.
Thus, any lowering that requires the
Commission to access and use a navigable waterway through any
channel is an unauthorized use of a navigable waterway. Second, the
court held that the Commission's interest was subservient to the
Government's dominant servitude. The court concluded that the issue
of whether the taking occurred beyond the OHWM was irrelevant
because the Commission's only interest was from access to and use of
navigable waters. And because the Commerce Clause specifically
designated that Government as the only power to regulate navigable
waterways, the Commission is prohibited from using the waterway
without the authorization of the Government. Therefore, navigational
servitude bars the Commission's taking claim.
Accordingly the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed the United States Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of
the Commission's taking claim.
Jennifer Berg
STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Davis v. Agua Sierra Res., L.L.C., 203 P.3d 506 (Ariz. 2009) (holding
that landowners outside of active management areas do not have a real
property interest in potential future groundwater use that may be
severed from the overlying land).
In 1981, Red Deer Cattle, Inc. ("Red Deer") bought CF Ranch from
Chino Ranch, Inc. ("Chino Ranch"). Chino Ranch reserved all mineral
and commercial water rights in the land. In 1984, Red Deer conveyed
the CF Ranch to Merwyn C. Davis ("Davis"). In the transfer, Red Deer
purportedly reserved "all commercial water rights and waters incident
and appurtenant to and within the real property." When Chino Ranch
merged with Red Deer, their claims to CF Ranch's water merged.
Subsequently, Chino Ranch and Red Deer conveyed portions of the
interest to various third parties, and in 1998 Red Deer and CJ Partners
each conveyed half an interest in CF Ranch's commercial water rights to
Agua Sierra Resources, L.L.C. ("Agua Sierra").
In 2003, Davis granted the City of Prescott, Arizona (the "City") an
option to buy CF Ranch and Davis' water rights. The City asked Davis to
purchase the commercial water rights from Agua Sierra, but he was
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unable to do so and the City allowed the option to expire. Davis then
filed suit against Agua Sierra to invalidate the commercial water rights
reservation, and Agua Sierra filed cross claims asking the court to
declare the water rights valid and quiet title to them.
The Yavapai County Superior Court (the "trial court") held that,
prior to capture and withdrawal from the ground, no ownership right to
groundwater exists. Finding for Davis on his motion for summary
judgment, the trial court explained that groundwater rights could not be
established or reserved for potential future use. The Arizona Court of
Appeals vacated that judgment, holding that Arizona allowed grantors
to reserve rights to prospective commercial use of percolating
groundwater below the conveyed land. Davis appealed to the Supreme
Court of Arizona (the "court").
Historically, the CF Ranch's water rights were unused. The Supreme
Court of Arizona thus limited its analysis to whether a right to potential
future use of historically unused groundwater existed. At common law,
groundwater is not appropriable and the overlying landowner can
pump it, subject to the reasonable use doctrine. The court described the
Groundwater Management Act ("GMA"), which established a
comprehensive framework to regulate Arizona's groundwater use. The
court determined that CF Ranch was not in an Active Management Area
("AMA"), and thus was not subject to the extraction and use limits of
AMAs. Since the City lies within such an area, however, the court
explained that any water pumped from a non-AMA to an AMA would be
subject to AMA regulations. Next, the court considered whether Arizona
recognized future rights to groundwater.
Agua Sierra argued that a right to prospective groundwater use can
be reserved when transferring an estate. To reserve groundwater
rights, the grantor must have a real property interest in such rights;
thus, the court addressed whether Arizona law recognized a real
property right to the future use of groundwater. In clarifying its ruling
in Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, the court reiterated that
landowners cannot own groundwater until they reduce it to actual
possession and control, and that Arizona recognizes no ownership right
to groundwater prior to capture and withdrawal from common supply.
Thus, the court said, the overlying owner's future right to historically
unused groundwater is really just an unvested expectancy concerning
potential future groundwater use. Since Agua Sierra did not identify any
pre-existing or current groundwater use on CF Ranch, the court found
no real property interest in the potential future use of CF Ranch's
groundwater.
The court next considered Agua Sierra's contention that a grantor's
reservations could effectively sever and reserve to the grantor whatever
"rights" a surface owner would otherwise have to the groundwater. The
court explained that the Court of Appeals, which cited Paloma Inv. Ltd.
P'ship v. Jenkins and Neal v. Hunt, improperly interpreted those cases.
The court found that Paloma did not establish a grantor's right to sell
groundwater from land it no longer owns, and Neal merely meant that
such a reservation, were it valid, would be subject to the recording
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statute. The court acknowledged that the GMA requires a landowner's
consent before transporting water off the land, and held that the
legislature did not believe a right to future prospective groundwater use
existed because otherwise it would not require consent if it believed
such rights existed and were transferrable. Thus, the court held that
landowners do not have a real property interest in potential future
groundwater use which they can sever from the overlying land.
The Supreme Court of Arizona vacated and remanded the case to the
Arizona Court of Appeals for hearing on other arguments.
Andrew Reitman
COLORADO
Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2009) (holding that coal-bed
methane gas wells' use of ground water constitutes a "beneficial use,"
giving rise to appropriative water rights; these rights are subject, under
statute, to permits issued by the State Engineer and to the State
Engineer's administration of augmentation plans approved by water
courts).
William S. Vance, Jr., Elizabeth S. Vance, James Fitzgerald, and Mary
Theresa Fitzgerald (the "Ranchers") possess water rights in sources
tributary to the Piedra and Pine Rivers. The Ranchers claimed that coalbed methane ("CBM") production diverted ground water that would
have otherwise discharged into the Piedra and Pine. CBM wells tap into
deep coalbed formations that contain methane gas trapped in
hydrostasis. By removing the water that surrounds the formations, CBM
producers release the gas for withdrawal. CBM producers bring the
water to the surface, store it briefly, and then re-inject it below the
aquifers that formerly held the gas.
The Ranchers brought a motion for declaratory judgment in the
Water Division 7 District Court (the "water court"), naming the Colorado
State Engineer and the Division Engineer of Water Division 7 ("the
Engineers") as defendants. The Ranchers sought a declaration that,
under statutory law, CBM production is a "beneficial use" of water that
places legal obligations on the Engineers to protect senior vested water
rights. The water court issued a summary judgment in the Ranchers'
favor and the Engineers appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme
Court. In this case of first impression, the court addressed whether CBM
production involves the beneficial use of water, whether the court must
defer to the Engineers' interpretation of beneficial use, and whether
CBM production is exclusively within the province of the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC").
Two state statutes aided the court in its determination of the
Engineers' obligations: the Colorado Ground Water Management Act
("GWM Act") and the Water Right Determination and Administration
Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"). The GWM Act states that people cannot build
new "wells" in designated areas without a permit. The 1969 Act defines
a well, generally, as a structure that obtains an aquifer's water for

